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1Abstract
This paper provides a methodological bridge leading from the well-developed theory
of credit rationing to the less developed territory of empirically identifying credit con-
straints. We begin by developing a simple model showing that credit constraints may
take three forms: quantity rationing, transaction cost rationing, and risk rationing.
Each form of non-price rationing adversely aﬀects household resource allocation and
thus should be accounted for in empirical analyses of credit market performance. We
then outline a survey strategy to directly classify households as credit unconstrained
or constrained and, if constrained, to further identify which of the three non-price ra-
tioning mechanisms is at play. We discuss several practical issues that arise due to
the use of a combination of “factual” and “interpretative” survey questions. Finally,
using a data set from northern Peru, we demonstrate the importance of accounting
for all three forms of credit constraints by estimating the increase in farm production
that would result from relaxing credit constraints. The inclusion of transaction- and
risk-rationed households in the constrained group results in an estimated impact that
is twice as large as the impact when only quantity rationed households are considered
constrained.
21 Introduction
How important are credit constraints in the process of economic development? Economic
theory suggests that credit constraints may have signiﬁcant negative impacts on income
and welfare, especially for poor households. Ex-ante credit constraints prevent individuals
from undertaking desired activities and from realizing proﬁt maximizing investment levels
in the activities they do engage in. Thus entrepreneurially talented but poor individuals are
prevented from starting businesses while liquidity strapped farmers are unable to purchase
a critical pesticide to fend oﬀ a pest infestation. By preventing gains from trade, ex-ante
credit constraints result in income enhancing opportunities being left on the table. Ex-post
credit constraints prevent individuals from borrowing after investment decisions have been
made and production outcomes realized. As demonstrated by Eswaran and Kotwal (1989,
1990) ex-post credit constraints both directly reduce welfare by preventing individuals from
borrowing to smooth consumption when income ﬂows are risky but also indirectly reduce
income and welfare by making risk averse individuals less likely to enter high return but
risky activities in the ﬁrst place. Taken together, ex-ante and ex-post credit constraints
may have strong implications for the likelihood that households fall into or climb out of
poverty traps (Carter and Barrett, 2006; Zimmerman and Carter, 2003) as well as for the
level and distribution of income in the overall economy (Aghion and Bolton, 1997; Banerjee
and Newman, 1993).
Considering the potentially far-reaching consequences of credit constraints suggested by
theory, empirical evidence on the impacts of credit constraints is relatively scarce. The lagged
response of the empirical literature can be attributed, in part, to the challenge of econometri-
cally identifying the impact of credit constraints. Ideally (at least from an economist’s point
of view) the economist would analyze a situation in which individuals, households, or ﬁrms
are randomly, or exogenously, assigned to be either credit constrained or unconstrained. Dif-
3ferences in outcomes, such as the probability of starting a business, the level of investment
and proﬁt, or the smoothness of consumption, could then be clearly attributed to the credit
constraint.
Recently, several researchers have proceeded along this line of randomization. Banerjee
and Duﬂo (2004) use an exogenous change in credit policy in India that increased the supply
of credit to medium sized ﬁrms to achieve identiﬁcation. Karlan and Zinman (2006) take
a more direct approach. They worked with a consumer lender in South Africa to run an
experiment whereby a randomly selected group of loan applicants that would normally be
rejected were instead oﬀered loans. A third example of this randomization approach comes
from research underway by DeMel, McKenzie and Woodruﬀ (2006) in Sri Lanka in which the
authors randomly select a group of micro-entrepreneurs to receive a gift of capital, either in
the form of machinery or cash. Again, a comparison of proﬁt and investment across the lucky
recipients versus the unlucky non-recipients can identify the impact of credit constraints.
While policy and ﬁeld experiments provide a clean way of gauging the impacts of credit
constraints, their use is still relatively limited. Relevant policy experiments are extremely
rare and ﬁeld experiments, while having great promise, are fraught with their own challenges
of design, implementation, ﬁnancing, and generalizability.
Beginning with papers by Jappelli (1990) and Feder et al. (1990), several authors have
followed an alternative approach that relies on more conventional survey-based research,
albeit with a methodological twist. This “twist” consists of adding a set of questions that
permits the researcher to directly elicit the household’s or ﬁrm’s status as either credit
constrained or unconstrained. With the observed separation of the sample into those that
are constrained versus unconstrained, the researcher can directly evaluate the impacts of
credit constraints on the eﬃciency of resource allocation. Examples of this approach, which
we call the direct elicitation methodology (DEM), include Petrick (2004) who evaluates the
impact of credit constraints on farm output in Poland; Foltz (2004) who evaluates the impact
4of credit constraints on farm proﬁt in Tunisia; and Carter and Olinto (2003) who examine
the impact of credit constraints on investment levels in Paraguay.
Given the centrality of ﬁnancial market to the process of development, the strengthening
of empirical methodologies for identifying credit constraints warrants a high priority among
research objectives. By describing, evaluating and suggesting extensions to the DEM, this
paper represents a step in this direction. Our objectives are ﬁvefold. First, we provide a
general discussion of the concept of credit rationing. This discussion is important because
diﬀerences in empirical strategies for measuring credit constraints as well as evaluation of the
impact of constraints can originate in deﬁnitional diﬀerences. To facilitate this discussion
we develop a simple model to demonstrate that asymmetric information can give rise to
three diﬀerent “mechanisms” of non-price rationing - quantity, transaction costs, and risk.
Second, we provide a detailed description of the DEM as well as several important issues and
challenges faced by the researcher in its implementation. As we will make clear, identifying
the constraint status of individuals that do not participate in the credit market is particularly
challenging, requiring a series of counter-factual questions. Our third objective is to provide
evidence, using a data set from rural Peru, that the DEM captures the underlying motivations
for non-participation. Fourth, we use the same data to demonstrate the importance of
accounting for all three manifestations of credit constraints (quantity, transaction costs, and
risk) by estimating their impacts on farm productivity under two alternative deﬁnitions of
credit constraints: a “restrictive” deﬁnition in which only quantity rationed households are
considered constrained and a “comprehensive” deﬁnition which also includes transaction cost
and risk rationed households as constrained. Finally, we conclude by oﬀering suggestions for
improving methodologies for identifying credit constraints.
52 Non-price Rationing: A Conceptual Framework
In this section we develop a simple model of a credit market and activity choice.1 Our
goal is to introduce the three diﬀerent types of non-price rationing - quantity, transaction
costs, and risk. All three forms of non-price rationing arise because of information and
enforcement problems associated with loan contracts and prevent households from realizing
proﬁtable projects. Thus households facing any of these three forms of non-price rationing
are eﬀectively constrained in the credit market. While quantity rationed households are
denied access to loans, risk and transaction cost rationed households instead voluntarily
withdraw from the credit market because of the non-price terms of available contracts. It is
particularly important to account for credit constraints deriving from these latter two forms
of non-price rationing because the types of policies that can alleviate them may be quite
diﬀerent from those designed to alleviate quantity rationing.
A farmer owns T acres of land and produces with a Leontief style technology requiring a
ﬁxed investment per-acre which, for simplicity, we assume is $1. The farmer has no liquidity
and thus requires a loan to ﬁnance production. The value of the farmer’s non-liquid assets,
including land and machinery, is A. There are two possible states of nature - success and
failure - that occur with probabilities p and 1−p respectively. Revenue per unit land under
success is Y and under failure is 0. The farmer’s reservation activity is to rent out the land
and earn w per unit land. Risk neutral lenders operate in a perfectly competitive market
and have an opportunity cost of capital equal to 1 + r. Assume that pY > 1 + r + w so
that, evaluated at the lender’s opportunity cost of capital, production is more proﬁtable than
renting out the land.
1For a recent review of the theoretical literature on quantity rationing, see Udry and Conning (2005).
62.1 Symmetric Information and the First-Best
We begin by assuming that lenders can costlessly observe all relevant borrower characteristics
and actions - i.e., they do not confront adverse selection or moral hazard. A credit contract
then speciﬁes the borrower’s repayment obligation under each state of nature. Letting i
denote the interest rate and k the collateral requirement per unit land, the borrower repays






A + T[Y − (1 + i)] if j = success
A − Tk if j = failure
(1)





i − r if j = success
k − (1 + r) if j = failure
(2)












kT ≤ A (4)
Equation 3 is the lender’s participation constraint and ensures that the lender earns a
non-negative return. Equation 4 is the limited liability constraint and acknowledges that, at
most, the borrower can post collateral worth A. Using equation 1 in the above program, it
7is easy to show that under the optimal contract the borrower would earn the entire surplus
(constraint 3 binds) and fully smooth consumption across states of nature. This simple
model highlights the dual functions of the credit market as both provider of liquidity and,
potentially, insurance. In the absence of information problems, lenders would be indiﬀerent
between contracts that trade lower collateral for higher interest rate at the rate of (1−p)/p.
Eﬃcient risk sharing would be achieved with the borrower paying a relatively high interest
rate while fully insuring his consumption against production risk. Thus even in the absence
of a well functioning insurance market, all socially desirable investments would be made if
credit markets were perfect. We denote the farmer’s credit demand in this ﬁrst-best world
as his notional demand.
2.2 Asymmetric Information and Non-Price Rationing
As is well established in the theoretical literature, the presence of asymmetric information
between borrowers and lenders results in problems of adverse selection and moral hazard
which may signiﬁcantly alter the performance of credit markets relative to the ﬁrst best
world. A common response of lenders to these information problems is to require collateral.
By providing incentives for borrowers to take actions that reduce the probability of failure,
collateral addresses moral hazard (Hoﬀ and Stiglitz, 1990). Collateral may also serve as a
mechanism for sorting borrowers of unobserved types (for example project riskiness) and
thereby also addresses adverse selection (Bester, 1987). We acknowledge the presence of
asymmetric information in our model by assuming that lenders require that borrowers post
a minimum of k units of collateral per unit land ﬁnanced.2 In addition, we assume that
posting any amount of collateral implies a ﬁxed cost, F, to the borrower.3 In terms of our
2While a complete model would endogenize k, that is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we simply
assume k exists and is the same for all borrowers. See Boucher, Carter and Guirkinger (2006) for an example
of a model that endogenizes the collateral requirement in a model of moral hazard.
3Posting collateral typically requires veriﬁcation of property deeds, veriﬁcation that the property is not
mortgaged to another party, and the actual registration of the mortgage itself. Each of these transactions
8optimization program, we add an additional constraint: k ≥ k.4 While the lender is still
willing to trade interest rate reductions for collateral increases at a rate of (1 − p)/p, he
is only willing to do so over a restricted range of contracts with suﬃciently high collateral.
This restriction of the feasible contract set gives rise to the ﬁrst form of non-price rationing
- namely quantity rationing. Farmers who cannot post the minimum required collateral
(A < Tk) are involuntarily excluded from the credit market. Quantity rationing occurs
when a farmer has a proﬁtable project, and thus positive notional demand for credit, but
faces zero supply.
As pointed out by several studies (Mushinski, 1999; Jappelli, 1990; Boucher et al., ming),
even though an agent has both positive notional demand and faces a positive supply, he
may not have positive eﬀective demand, deﬁned as the demand for contracts available in
the “actually existing” or asymmetric information world. There are two reasons that an
agent who could obtain a loan to invest in a proﬁtable activity would choose not to borrow.
First, transaction costs reduce the expected income associated with a credit contract by
F. As a result, a contract yields greater expected income than the reservation activity if
pY > 1+r +w + F
T . A farmer who has positive notional demand but zero eﬀective demand
because of the size of transaction costs is called transaction cost rationed.
Second, the collateral requirement forces the borrower to bear a minimum amount of risk
and thus may drive the borrower’s expected utility below his reservation utility, even though
taking the credit contract would raise expected consumption. In this case the borrower
is risk rationed - he has access to an expected income enhancing contract but chooses to
voluntarily withdraw from the credit market to instead undertake the lower return but certain
reservation activity.
To summarize, asymmetric information can give rise to three types of non-price rationing.
The ﬁrst, quantity rationing, has been emphasized in both the theoretical and empirical lit-
implies a trip to the property registry and a fee.
4Note that this constraint is essentially an incentive compatibility constraint in a model of moral hazard.
9erature. Quantity rationing is a supply side constraint and occurs when a borrower’s eﬀective
demand exceeds supply. It reﬂects the reduction in the lender’s willingness to oﬀer contracts
resulting from the presence of asymmetric information. In contrast, both transaction cost
and risk rationing reﬂect the reduction in credit demand that may result from asymmetric
information. Any evaluation of the performance of credit markets should incorporate these
three non-price rationing mechanisms, as each implies that proﬁtable investments are for-
gone. Similarly, eﬀorts aimed at overcoming credit constraints must identify the relative
impact of each of these mechanisms as they require a diﬀerent set of policies. The ﬁrst
step in that direction is to identify which households are credit constrained and by which
mechanism.
3 Eliciting Credit Constraints - a Practical Approach
In this section we outline a strategy to directly elicit credit constraints. We ﬁrst deﬁne uncon-
strained and constrained households based on the relationships between household speciﬁc
supply, notional demand and eﬀective demand. We then examine how these deﬁnitions can
be operationalized in household surveys. Finally we discuss three central issues that arise in
the direct elicitation approach. Much of this discussion is based on lessons learned from our
accumulated eﬀorts to elicit credit constraints in household surveys in Guatemala (Barham,
Boucher and Carter, 1996) , Honduras and Nicaragua (Boucher, Barham and Carter, 2005),
and Peru (Guirkinger and Boucher, 2006; Guirkinger and Trivelli, 2006)
3.1 Deﬁning Constraint Categories
Let DE
i and DN
i denote, respectively, the eﬀective and notional demands for credit of house-
hold i. Similarly, let Si denote the credit limit, or the maximum amount of credit a lender
is willing to supply to the same household. The conceptual discussion from section 2 implies
10that a household (or individual or ﬁrm) will fall into one of three mutually exclusive cate-
gories: unconstrained, supply-side constrained, and demand-side constrained. We describe
each in turn.
Unconstrained, or price-rationed, households are unaﬀected by asymmetric information





i ≤ Si (5)
While asymmetric information may imply that lenders impose a credit limit, this limit is not
binding for unconstrained households. Depending on their endowments and opportunities,
unconstrained households may be either borrowers (DE
i > 0) or non-borrowers (DE
i = 0).
Supply-side constrained, or quantity rationed, households face a binding credit limit and






Note that while asymmetric information may reduce these households’ eﬀective demand
relative to their notional demand, the limiting constraint comes from the supply side. As
such, we expect these households to demonstrate excess demand. We take up the question
of how to detect this excess demand in practice in the next section.
Finally, demand-side constrained households do not face a binding credit limit and thus








i ≤ Si (8)
The ﬁrst inequality implies a wedge between notional and eﬀective demand due either to
11the risk sharing rules of the best contract available or the transaction costs associated with
loan application. The second inequality implies that the limiting constraint comes from the
demand side.
3.2 Operationalizing Constraint Categories
The classiﬁcation of a household’s constraint status typically draws on two modules within
the credit section of a household survey. Figures 1 and 2 provide examples of these two
modules. Figure 1 depicts the ﬁrst half of the “loan characteristics module” from the survey
of farm households in Peru that will serve as the basis for the empirical analysis of Sections 4
and 5. This module collects information to characterize loan contracts and is administered
to households that borrowed during the recall period. Figure 2 consists of two portions. The
upper portion (above the dotted line) depicts a “credit market perceptions module” used to
describe experiences in, and perceptions of, the credit market for households that did not
borrow during the recall period. The bottom portion of Figure 2 does not appear in the
survey but instead shows how non-borrowers’ responses lead to the classiﬁcation of their
constraint status and rationing mechanism.
3.2.1 Identifying supply side constrained households
We now turn to operationalizing the classiﬁcation scheme described above. We begin with
supply-side constrained households. Equation 6 will hold if a household received less than its
desired amount of credit given the terms of contracts available in the market. In identifying
supply-side constrained households from survey data, it is useful to distinguish three separate
groups. The ﬁrst group consists of unsatisﬁed borrowers. These individuals received a loan,
but the loan amount was less than their eﬀective demand. To identify this group, we use
the response to question 11 in Figure 1, “Would you have wanted a larger loan at the same
interest rate?” There are two details to note in the formulation of this question. First, the
12borrower is asked to compare the amount she received to the amount that she wanted. While
it might seem more intuitive to compare the amount received with the amount applied for,
this would be problematic inasmuch as the borrower may know the lender’s supply rule and
thus have only applied for the amount she qualiﬁed for. Second, the question emphasizes that
the desired amount is conditional upon the interest rate. In practice, when asked without
conditioning on the interest rate, respondents often interpreted the question as asking for
their total working capital needs under an interest-free loan. Finally, although not essential
for our present purpose of discrete categorization of constraint status, question 11 is followed
by a question that asks the desired loan size. This identiﬁes a point on the borrower’s demand
curve and is thus useful to analyze continuous loan demand and estimate the shadow value
of liquidity.
The second group is rejected applicants, who have positive eﬀective demand but a zero
credit limit. As this group did not borrow, they are identiﬁed using the credit market
perception module. In Figure 2, this group responds “Yes” to question 2 which asks if they
have applied and were rejected. A speciﬁc issue is the time frame speciﬁed in this question.
If a household’s credit limit were time invariant, then the appropriate question would be
whether or not the household has ever been rejected. If, as is more likely, the credit limit
changes over time, then a shorter recall period is preferable. Questions 3, 4, and 5 are not
necessary for the constraint classiﬁcation; however, they provide quantitative information on
loan demand as well as qualitative information on perceived reasons for loan rejection.
The ﬁnal supply-side constrained group is “certainly-rejected” non-applicants, who had
positive eﬀective demand but did not apply for a loan because - based on past experience
or their perceptions of lenders’ supply rules - they were certain their loan application would
be rejected. As these are non-borrowers, we again use the perceptions module (Figure 2) to
classify their constraint status. Given that they did not apply for a loan, they are ﬁltered to
question 6 which asks if they believe the lender would oﬀer a loan if they applied. If yes, then
13we know that the household is not supply-side constrained. If no, the enumerator continues
with question 8: “If you were certain that a lender would approve your application, would
you apply?” If yes, then the household is classiﬁed as constrained.5
3.2.2 Identifying demand-side constrained households
As in the case of supply-side constraints, demand-side constrained households can be either
borrowers or non-borrowers. In both cases these households’ eﬀective demand is reduced
by transaction costs or risk. Our discussion here will focus on how to identify demand-side
constrained non-borrowers who completely withdraw from credit markets.6
Begin at question 6 in Figure 2 which asks “would a bank lend to you if you applied?”
Demand-side constrained non-borrowers are found among both those with and without per-
ceived access. Households that answer “yes” to question 6 and thus believe they have credit
access are then asked why they did not apply (question 7). Their response to this ques-
tion, as discussed below, allows their classiﬁcation as unconstrained or constrained and, if
constrained, as transaction cost rationed or risk rationed. Households that answer “no” to
question 6 and thus believe they have no credit access are then asked in question 8 whether
they would want a loan if they were certain the lender would approve their application. As
discussed above, those who say “yes” are the certainly-rejected non-applicants and are clas-
siﬁed as supply-side rationed. Those who say “no” are then asked why not in question 9 and
classiﬁed as unconstrained or constrained and, if constrained, as transaction cost rationed
or risk rationed.
5One speciﬁc issue to be aware of is the wording of question 8. Notice that we do not ask “would you
accept a loan if you were oﬀered one?” The reason is that the word “oﬀered” may imply that the respondent
need not incur the costs of application.
6Ignoring demand-side constrained borrowers is likely to have little impact on the evaluation of the
performance of credit markets for two reasons. First, since transaction costs typically have an important
ﬁxed component, they should have relatively little impact on eﬀective demand for those who borrow. Second,
the scope for borrowers to reduce risk by taking smaller loans is limited because collateral assets are typically
lumpy and cannot be marginally adjusted, and many agricultural lenders oﬀer boilerplate loan contracts in
which loan size is a ﬁxed multiple of area cultivated.
14As is hopefully clear by now, one of the main objectives of this method is to gather
additional information on the credit market perceptions of non-borrowers. In particular,
determining constraint status requires learning why some households choose not to borrow
even though they believe they qualify for a loan. In Figure 2, questions 7 and 9 elicit this
information. Table 1 provides typical responses to these questions and the subsequent classi-
ﬁcation of households. Recall that unconstrained non-borrowers have zero notional demand
and no proﬁtable projects that require outside ﬁnancing. This group can be highly diverse,
including households with large endowments of productive assets and liquidity as well as
endowment-poor households with limited investment opportunities. Response C “Farming
does not give enough to repay a debt.” is a common response from this latter type of uncon-
strained household. Other frequent responses suggesting that the household is unconstrained
include “The interest rate is too high” and “I don’t need a loan.” Some responses do not lend
themselves to an unambiguous classiﬁcation. For example, the response D “I prefer working
with my own liquidity” could be consistent with both price rationing and risk rationing.7 For
these responses, we suggest following a conservative approach and classifying the household
as unconstrained.
A demand-side constrained household, in contrast, has a proﬁtable investment beyond its
own liquidity that it forgoes due to risk or transaction costs. Rows E-H of Table 1 provide
examples of responses associated with risk rationing. Of these, the most common response
in each of the surveys we conducted was “I don’t want to risk my land.”8 Rows I and J
are common responses indicating that the household was discouraged from borrowing by
transaction costs. It is important to note that we interpret responses E-J as indicating that
7This response could be given by high liquidity households that are unconstrained, as well as by households
with investment opportunities requiring funds beyond their own liquidity but that chose not to borrow
because of risk.
8The surveys we have conducted were carried out in regions where banks exist and tend to require titled
property as collateral. In areas where banks do not operate or where land cannot be used as collateral,risk
rationing can still occur but is likely to manifest itself via diﬀerent responses. For example, risk rationing
may be quite common in villages dominated by a stereotypical moneylender who requires the borrower to
put up his reputation or “knee-caps” as collateral.
15households have a proﬁtable use for credit (i.e. have positive notional demand) and have
considered taking a loan, but decided not to because of risk or transaction cost.9
3.3 Issues and Challenges in Classiﬁcation via Direct Elicitation
Several important issues and challenges arise when using the DEM. We discuss what we
consider to be the four most important. The ﬁrst two involve choices about how to deﬁne
units of analysis when designing the questionnaire. The second two are more conceptual and
are related to the DEM’s partial reliance on hypothetical and counter-factual questions - as
opposed to observed actions - to identify the constraint status of respondents who do not
participate in the credit market.
3.3.1 Issue 1: Deﬁnition of Loan Sectors
The ﬁrst issue to consider in designing the perception module is how the lender is deﬁned to
the respondent. In practice, rural credit markets are composed of a group of heterogenous
lenders including commercial banks, state banks, NGO’s and a wide range of informal lenders.
Both the access rules and contract terms facing a given household may vary widely across
these lenders. As a result, a household may be unconstrained with respect to one type of
lender but constrained with respect to other lenders that oﬀer more favorable contracts, for
example with longer maturity or lower cost. In this case, the constraint would be binding
and adversely aﬀect the household’s resource allocation. Given this concern, lenders should
be grouped into distinct sectors, or segments, of the credit market, and the language of the
qualitative questions in the perceptions module should be cast with respect to these sectors.
Another reason to deﬁne distinct loan sectors is to test sector speciﬁc hypotheses. For
9An alternative way to identify unmet notional demand is to ask what the household would do with
additional liquidity. Under this approach, followed for example by Paulson and Townsend (2004), households
that say they would expand productive enterprizes (business or farm) or invest in working capital are classiﬁed
as credit constrained. This question, however, does not provide suﬃcient information to distinguish between
supply and demand-side rationing.
16example, we might be interested in evaluating a policy that aﬀects a certain type of in-
stitution. Mushinski (1999) uses the direct elicitation approach to evaluate the impact of
market oriented reforms implemented by credit unions in Guatemala on the prevalence of
non-price rationing in the credit unions. We also might be interested in testing the existence
of a preference hierarchy across loan sectors. Until recently, most theoretical and empirical
models assumed that the formal loan sector is strictly preferred by all borrowers (Bell et al.,
1997). Several authors have challenged this assumption, arguing that informal contracts may
be preferred because of lower cost (Kochar, 1997; Chung, 1995) or lower risk (Boucher and
Guirkinger, forthcoming). Appropriately deﬁning sectors allows testing of these hypotheses.
3.3.2 Issue 2: Household versus Individual Constraints
The second deﬁnitional issue is whether the credit constraint classiﬁcation should be deﬁned
at the household or individual level. Until now, we have couched the discussion at the
household level. This approach is appropriate if we believe household resource allocation is
consistent with a “unitary” household model in which endowments and income are pooled
amongst household members. The qualitative questions of the perceptions module would
then be addressed to the household head, who would respond for the overall household.
We assume that the head can, given the endowments and opportunities available to the
household, assess the eﬀective and notional demand of - as well as the supply available to -
the entire household.
If, in contrast, resources are not pooled within the household or information is not shared,
then individual characteristics - including whether or not individuals are credit constrained
- may impact the household’s resource allocation. In this case, each individual’s constraint
status needs to be elicited and thus the perception module is applied to each adult in the
household. This individual approach, while costly, is useful for testing hypotheses related to
gender bias in credit access and intra-household resource allocation processes. It has been
17used by Diagne et al. (2001) in an exploration of credit markets in Malawi.
3.3.3 Issue 3: Use of Respondents’ Perceptions of Lender Supply Rules
In order to classify non-borrowers as constrained or unconstrained, the perceptions module
relies on several hypothetical questions. Identiﬁcation of supply-side constraints hinges on
question 6, which asks non-applicants if they believe a bank would lend to them if they
were to apply. There are two potential concerns associated with the use of this question.
First, the respondent may not understand the question. Until this point in the survey, the
respondent has been bombarded with “factual” recall questions such as the reconstruction of
farm revenues and costs. Question 6 requires the respondent to change gears and think about
the outcome of a loan application that was not made. Clearly communicating this type of
question is a non-trivial task. Beyond a clear phrasing of the question itself, eﬀective use
of this type of hypothetical question requires careful selection and training of enumerators,
who may need to step outside of the literal question in order to convey the idea.
The second issue is that identiﬁcation of a binding supply constraint relies on the re-
spondent’s perception of the lender’s willingness to oﬀer them a loan. This perception may
be incorrect. For our objective of gauging the impacts of credit constraints on resource
allocation, however, respondents’ misperceptions of a lender’s ‘true” supply rule is not prob-
lematic. Consider two individuals with positive eﬀective demand that are identical except
in their perceptions of the lender’s supply rule. The ﬁrst correctly believes he faces positive
supply and thus ends up taking a loan and carrying out the investment project. The second
incorrectly believes he faces zero supply. As a result, he does not apply and forgoes the
project. These two households would be classiﬁed as credit unconstrained and constrained,
respectively. The diﬀerence in their resource allocations is determined by the diﬀerence in
their perceived supply rule, which is captured by the DEM, rather than the “true” supply
rule. Next consider non-applicants who incorrectly believed that a lender would oﬀer them
18a loan. This misperception also would not cause classiﬁcation error. Since they believe
they could get a loan but did not apply, the lender’s “true” supply rule does not constrain
these respondents. Instead, they are either unconstrained or demand-side constrained, as
indicated by their response to question 7 in Figure 2.10
3.3.4 Issue 4: Identifying Notional Demand of Non-Borrowers via Subjective
Questions
Use of the DEM requires that it accurately captures the “true” rationing mechanism of
respondents. Identifying the rationing mechanism of loan applicants is straightforward; the
joint outcome of the respondent’s action (loan application) and the lender’s action (approval
or rejection) allows the researcher to sort applicants into those that are price rationed versus
those that are quantity rationed. Non-applicants pose a greater challenge because the fact
that they did not apply for a loan does not imply zero notional demand. The DEM proposes
identifying notional demand for these respondents by understanding the underlying reasons
fro their lack of eﬀective demand; i.e., why thee respondents did not, or would not, apply
for a loan. This is accomplished via question 7 and 9 in Figure 2.
The question, and perhaps the central concern of the DEM, is how certain are we that
the answers respondents give to these two questions capture their true motivation for not
applying? Consider, for example, a farmer who says that he did not apply for fear of losing
his land. Can we be certain that this individual is risk rationed? Or might this response
instead reﬂect low quality land and a lack of productive opportunities? If so, then the
respondent should be classiﬁed as price rationed (unconstrained). Ideally, we would observe
whether or not this respondent applies for a loan in a counter-factual world in which loans
10While misperceptions of lenders’ supply rules do not imply errors in the DEM’s classiﬁcation scheme,
gauging the accuracy of non-borrowers’ perceptions is relevant for policy. If households refrain from borrowing
because they systematically underestimate lenders’ willingness to lend or overestimate the interest rate,
risk or transaction cost of contracts that are available to them, then policies that increase the ﬂow of
information to rural households would be more appropriate than policies that seek to change the contract
terms themselves.
19carried less contractual risk. Ultimately, the DEM requires a suﬃcient degree of certainty
that the line of direct questions in the survey accurately capture the true motivations for
non-application. Given the centrality of this issue, we provide evidence on the ability of
the DEM to eﬀectively distinguish between demand-side constrained versus unconstrained
non-borrowers in the next section.
4 How Reliable is the DEM? Evidence from Peru
In this section we address the ﬁnal, an most important, issue raised in the previous section.
We do so by using survey data from Peru to provide evidence on the degree to which the
DEM eﬀectively distinguishes between constrained versus unconstrained non-borrowers. We
use these same data in the next section to demonstrate the importance of including both
supply and demand-side constraints when evaluating the performance of a credit market.
4.1 Data Description and the Frequency of Credit Rationing
The data come from a panel survey of farm households in the department of Piura, on
Peru’s north coast. In 1997, a random sample of 547 farm households was drawn from the
comprehensive lists of farmers maintained by the irrigation commissions. In 2003, we found
and resurveyed 499 of the original households, of which 442 were still farming.
The sample is representative of the irrigated, commercial agriculture of Piura’s coast.
The descriptive statistics in table 2 provide an overview of these households. The median
farm size in the sample is 3 hectares; with over 90% of households farming less than 10
irrigated hectares. This predominance of small farms is a legacy of Peru’s agrarian reform
of the 1960’s and 1970’s. Property rights reform was a pillar of the economic liberalization
program of the 1990’s. In Piura, this is reﬂected in the increase from 49% to 70% of sample
households with a registered property title over the study period.
20The survey was designed to measure the incidence and impacts of credit constraints in the
formal credit sector which, in Piura, consists of commercial banks, municipal banks (cajas
municipales), and rural banks (cajas rurales). A non-borrower perceptions module similar
to the one in Figure 2 was repeated for each type of institution to which the household did
not apply for a loan. A loan characteristics module captured details of all loans taken from
both formal and informal sources. Based on the method described in section 3, we used
these two modules to identify each household’s rationing mechanism.
Table 3 shows the frequency of each type of rationing mechanism among sample house-
holds. Using the comprehensive deﬁnition of credit constraint, which includes quantity, risk
and transaction cost rationing, the fraction of households that are constrained in the for-
mal credit sector fell from 57% in 1997 to 44% in 2003. Risk and transaction cost rationed
households account for a signiﬁcant fraction of the sample. If we instead use the restric-
tive deﬁnition and only include quantity rationed households as constrained, these numbers
would fall to 37% and 10%. The table also shows that (under the comprehensive deﬁnition)
credit constraints become less prevalent over time. The reduction in credit constraints is
driven primarily by a decrease in quantity rationing. This is consistent with a relaxation of
supply-side constraints due to the advances of the land titling program in the period between
surveys. The reduction in quantity rationing is partially oﬀset, however, by an increase in
risk rationing. One interpretation of this ﬁnding is that, in a context such as Piura where
formal insurance markets are inexistent, land titles are necessary but not suﬃcient to relax
credit constraints as some households are unwilling to put their land at risk as collateral.
4.2 Evidence on the Reliability of the DEM
Use of the DEM requires that the subjective questions at the heart of the approach accu-
rately distinguish between those non-applicants that are constrained versus unconstrained.
In this section we use the Peru data to provide initial evidence on the accuracy of the DEM’s
21classiﬁcation of non-borrowers. Our strategy is to examine correlations between observed
rationing categories and various factors that are likely to aﬀect credit supply, the size of trans-
action costs, and the risk preferences and of background risk faced by sample households.
We expect, for example, that risk rationing should be more likely among households that
are more risk averse. We begin by comparing means of these factors across rationing cate-
gories. To control for likely correlations across these factors, we then estimate a multinomial
logit regression of households’ observed rationing mechanism against various explanatory
variables underlying credit supply and demand, including our proxies for background risk,
risk preferences, and transaction costs. As several of the variables we use were only collected
in the 2003 survey, the analysis in the remainder of this section is restricted to the 2003
cross-section.
Table 4 compares the means of the seven correlates across rationing categories. The
variable TITLE is the fraction of the household’s farm area with a registered property title
and is included as a control for credit supply. Titled land is the most common form of
collateral used by formal lenders in Piura. In addition, even when a formal mortgage is not
established, lenders frequently require the borrower to hand over their title until the loan is
repaid in order to prevent borrowers from simultaneously taking loans from other lenders.
Economic theory suggests that property titles may also have investment (and thus credit)
demand eﬀects, in particular via reducing tenure insecurity (Besley 1995). In the study
context, however, tenure security eﬀects of title are likely to be minimal because the primary
beneﬁciaries of the titling programs did not suﬀer from insecure property rights prior to the
program.11
11Two distinct groups were the primary beneﬁciaries of this program: members of the ex-agrarian reform
cooperatives (parceleros) and members of peasant communities (comuneros). The de-collectivization of
cooperatives that concluded in the early 1990’s was carried out without cadastral surveys of the individual
parcels granted to the parceleros. As a result, although parceleros had a high degree of tenure security
they could not acquire a private property title. A primary aim of the ﬁrst wave of the government’s titling
program of the mid-1990’s was to demarcate these plots and provide titles to parceleros. Comuneros were
in a similar situation as they possessed inheritable usufruct rights to individual parcels, however all land
within the community was formally owned by the peasant community itself. A 1997 amendment to Peru’s
22The next two variables are proxies for the transaction costs associated with loan applica-
tion. DISTANCE gives the travel time in public transportation to the nearest formal lender,
which is likely to be positively correlated with transaction costs. The variable INFORMED
takes value one if the respondent correctly identiﬁed the Economics Minister and serves as a
proxy for the household’s knowledge of formal economics institutions. As the loan applica-
tion process may require the applicant to interact with formal institutions such as notaries
and the Property Registry, this variable is likely to be negatively correlated with transaction
costs.
The ﬁnal three variables are proxies for environmental risk, risk preferences and risk
bearing capacity. The variable CV is the coeﬃcient of variation of yields in the district of
the household’s farm.12 Other things equal, we expect the probability of risk rationing to
be increasing in the production risk associated with the household’s farm location. Hold-
ing constant the risk environment, we also expect risk rationing to be more likely for more
risk averse individuals. The variable RA is an individual speciﬁc measure of risk aversion
computed using a set of questions included in the 2003 survey.13 Finally, the variable MAX-
INFORMAL is the maximum amount of money the household said it could receive from
family and friends in case of an emergency. This variable is included as a proxy for the
strength of informal insurance networks and is expected to be negatively related to the
probability of risk rationing.
A comparison of variable means suggests that the classiﬁcation delivered by the DEM is
land law provided peasant communities the option to privatize and title individual parcels. Providing titles
in peasant communities was a major goal of the second wave of the titling program carried out in the late
1990’s through 2005.
12In Peru, “district” corresponds to the third level of political dis-aggregation after Department and
Province and is the most disaggregated level for which the Ministry of Agriculture provides historical yield
data. Our sample is spread across twelve separate districts.
13The questions were framed in reference to a common form of lottery in Peru called a rifa in which a
ﬁxed number of individuals contribute a fee into a common pot. A single winner is then randomly drawn.
Sample households were asked how much they would be willing to pay for a rifa ticket with a 10 players,
each of whom contributed 100 Soles. Their response, R, indicates the expected return required to make them
indiﬀerent between participating or not. Using a second order approximation, the coeﬃcient of absolute risk
aversion can thus be computed as RA =
(10−R)
0.5(10−R)2
23roughly consistent with expectations. Recall that our ﬁrst concern is separating constrained
from unconstrained non-borrowers. Compared to unconstrained non-borrowers, transaction
cost rationed households live in villages that are further away from formal lenders and they
are less likely to correctly identify the current economics minister. Turning to risk rationed
households, we see that they tend to live in districts with greater background risk and
are more risk averse compared to both unconstrained non-borrowers and transaction cost
rationed households.
The likely correlations across our diﬀerent explanatory variables require that we move to a
multivariate analysis. The framework we use is the single equation multinomial logit model.
Let Yi be a categorical variable that takes values 0,1,...,J and that represents the observed
credit market rationing outcome of household i. Deﬁne Y ∗
ij as the unobserved “propensity”
of household i to be in rationing category j. Y ∗





jXi + ij (9)
where Xi is a vector of household characteristics; βj is a vector of parameters associated with
the j’th category; and ij is the unobserved component of the i’th household’s propensity
to be in category j. The observed category is the one with the highest propensity. The
probability that household i is in the j’th rationing category is thus:




ik) ∀k 6= j (10)
The model is operationalized by assuming that the J + 1, ij terms are independent and
identically distributed with Weibull distribution.
The regressors and their means are summarized in table 5. The ﬁrst four variables are
measures of the household’s productive endowments including farm-land, non-farm wealth,
education and the amount of family labor available to work on the farm. These variables
24are included to control for the quality of the household’s investment opportunities and po-
tential demand for credit. The remaining variables are the correlates of transaction costs,
background risk and risk aversion discussed above.
4.3 Results of Multinomial Logit
Table 6 reports the marginal impacts of each regressor on the probability of the “median”
household being observed in each rationing category. As discussed above, our primary con-
cern is the ability of the DEM to eﬀectively distinguish between non-borrowing households
that are constrained versus unconstrained and, secondarily, to identify the underlying source
of the constraint for constrained households.
Consider ﬁrst transaction cost rationing. As expected, the probability of transaction cost
rationing is increasing in distance to the nearest lender and decreasing in the household-level
information variable, although the impact of these variables is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero. Having a registered land title is associated with a signiﬁcantly lower probability
of transaction cost rationing. One possible explanation for this result is that eligibility for a
land title requires that individuals provide a series of documents such as the national identity
card, utility receipts and receipts for payment of water rights. Many of these documents are
also required by formal lenders, so that households that did not meet the documentation
requirements for titling are more likely to say that they did not apply for a loan because
providing documents would be too expensive.14
Next consider risk rationing. As anticipated, both an increase in background risk as
proxied by the coeﬃcient of variation of district yield and an increase in individual speciﬁc
risk aversion signiﬁcantly raise the probability of being risk rationed. Having access to
larger potential transfers from family and friends, as expected, decreases the probability of
14One might suspect that housheolds in villages farther from lenders and thus facing higher transaction
costs were also less likely to receive title. This spurious correlation would not be picked up by the title
variable, however, as we have controlled for distance from lender.
25risk rationing, however the marginal impact is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Finally, consider the quantity rationing regime. Property title has a strong and signiﬁcant
negative impact on the probability of a household facing a binding supply-side constraint.
This is expected as formal lenders in Piura are increasingly requiring borrowers to post real
collateral.
Taken together, these results provide evidence that the DEM is capturing meaningful
diﬀerences across non-borrowing households. The results with respect to the risk-related
variables are particularly encouraging. The district-level coeﬃcient of variation and the
individual speciﬁc risk aversion parameter, both of which are arguably exogenous, are strong
predictors of risk rationing. These results suggest that the DEM indeed allows the researcher
to distinguish individuals whose credit demand is most aﬀected by risk. The results are less
informative with respect to transaction cost rationing. It is not clear, however, whether this
reﬂects an inability of the DEM to eﬀectively detect those households deterred by transaction
costs or instead a lack of strong instruments for transaction costs in the multinomial logit
regression. We will return to these issues and suggest several options for strengthening the
DEM in the ﬁnal section.
5 The Impacts of Credit Constraints on Agricultural
Production in Peru
One of the advantages of the direct elicitation approach is that it accounts for the multiple
forms of non-price rationing that, as we argued in section 2, are likely to exist in rural credit
markets. Each form restricts household participation in the credit market and adversely af-
fects investment; thus each should be accounted for in any evaluation of the performance of
rural credit markets. In this section we use both years of the Peru data to illustrate how the
consideration of demand side constraints aﬀects our estimation of the impact of credit con-
26straints on agricultural production. Table 7 compares mean productivity levels by rationing
mechanism for the pooled data set. Compared to price rationed households, the value of
production per-hectare is signiﬁcantly lower for quantity, risk and transaction cost rationed
households, suggesting that each form of non-price rationing adversely aﬀects farm resource
allocation. Failure to consider risk and transaction cost rationing would result in a signiﬁcant
under-estimate of the frequency of credit constraints. In this example, the under-estimation
would be 26%, the combined frequency of risk and transaction cost rationing in the sample.
In addition, the low productivity of risk and transaction cost rationed households suggests
that in more aggregate terms, the restrictive deﬁnition would also result in a signiﬁcant
under-estimation of the eﬃciency and income loss due to credit constraints. Whether or not
we can attribute these impacts to credit constraints per se, however, is not certain since we
have not controlled for other factors that aﬀect farm productivity and that may be corre-
lated with households’ credit constraint status. This section develops an econometric model
that controls for both observed and unobserved determinants of farm productivity and thus
allows us to isolate the impact of credit constraints.
5.1 Econometric Model
Consider the following linear speciﬁcation of farm productivity:
yit = α + βCit + γZit + ηi + εit (11)
The dependent variable, yit, is the per-hectare value of farm output for household i in period
t. The binary variable Cit takes value one if the household is constrained in the formal sector
in period t and zero if unconstrained. Zit is a vector of time varying household and farm
characteristics that impact productivity. Included in Zit are: the household’s endowments
of land, liquidity and labor; the household’s dependency ratio; the availability of regular
27wage earners; the size of the household’s cattle herd, and dummy variables indicating the
household’s crop mix. The deﬁnitions, means and standard deviations of all variables are
reported in Table 8. The household ﬁxed eﬀect, ηi, captures the impact of time invariant
household characteristics aﬀecting productivity, while α, β, and γ are parameters to be
estimated. Finally, εit is a mean zero error term.
We are primarily interested in β, which gives the impact of being credit constrained on
farm productivity. In order to see how the deﬁnition of the credit constraint inﬂuences β we
estimate equation 11 twice - ﬁrst using the restrictive deﬁnition then using the comprehensive
deﬁnition. In estimating β, we face two potential sources of bias. First, the household
ﬁxed eﬀect is unobserved and potentially correlated with the other regressors. We estimate
equation 11 using ﬁrst diﬀerences and thereby eliminate this potential source of bias. Second,
unobserved time varying factors such as shocks to land quality or health may be correlated
with both productivity and the household’s credit constraint status. To address this potential
source of endogeneity, we use an instrumental variable approach. We use two instruments
for the household’s credit constraint status. The ﬁrst, Tit, is the property title variable from
Section 4, deﬁned as the proportion of the household’s owned land that has a registered
property title. As discussed above, titled land is the primary form of collateral required
by formal lenders so that this variable should reduce the probability of being constrained
but is unlikely to have any direct eﬀect on productivity via enhance tenure security because
non-titled farmers possess alternative documents recognized by local authorities. The second
instrument, Nit, is a network variable that measures the proportion of a household’s neighbors
with a formal loan. A higher fraction of neighbors participating in the formal credit market
is anticipated to decrease the probability of being constrained as it is likely to reduce both
the transaction costs associated with loan application and the uncertainty resulting from an
incomplete understanding of contract terms.15
15The network variable is constructed using a weighting matrix where the weights are inversely proportional
to the distance between households in the sample. Neighbors are deﬁned as households living within 10km
28The estimation is carried out using two-stage least square (2SLS) with robust standard
errors. For each estimation the instruments are jointly signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst stage and pass
the Hansen J test of overidentiﬁcation. It suggests that our instruments are valid in the sense
of being strongly correlated with the probability of being constrained and being orthogonal
to the disturbance term εit.16
5.2 Estimation Results and Discussion
Table 9 presents results of the estimations. The ﬁrst column reports the results under the
restrictive deﬁnition of credit constraints, while the second column reports the results under
the comprehensive deﬁnition.
Under both deﬁnitions, credit constraints have a negative and signiﬁcant impact on farm
productivity. The parameter estimate ˆ β is similar when the comprehensive deﬁnition of
credit constraints is used instead of the restrictive deﬁnition. Under both deﬁnitions, relaxing
credit constraints would raise the value of production per hectare by $685 on average. As
many more households are classiﬁed as constrained under the comprehensive deﬁnition, the
regression results suggest that the overall impact of credit constraints is much larger when
the comprehensive deﬁnition is used.
These results can be used to generate an estimate of the percentage increase in total value
of agricultural production if all credit constraints were relaxed in the region. To do so, we
compute ∆, deﬁned as follows:
∆ =
P













where j ∈ J, and J is the set of credit constrained observations in the pooled sample. The
of the household considered.
16Results of the F-test of joint signiﬁcance and of the Hansen test are reported in the two last row of
Table 9. The null hypothesis of the Hansen test is that the instruments are independent of εit, failing to
reject the null hypothesis therefore suggests that the set of instrument is valid.
29numerator gives the predicted change in the total value of production if the credit constraints
of households observed to be constrained were relaxed. The denominator gives the total
observed value of production for all households in the sample. We ﬁnd that alleviating
credit constraints would raise regional output by 15.1% under the restrictive deﬁnition and
by 32.6% under the comprehensive deﬁnition.17 In this example, accounting for transaction
cost and risk rationing leads to a measure of impact that is over twice as large as that
obtained under the restrictive deﬁnition. This sharp increase reﬂect the fact that transaction
cost and risk rationed households control 24% of sample land. When they are included in
the constrained group, the percentage of land controlled by constrained farmers increases
from 20% to 44% of total land in the sample.
6 Conclusion
Asymmetric information and enforcement problems can give rise to multiple forms of non-
price rationing in credit markets. Quantity rationing has received the bulk of the attention
in the economics literature. Yet transaction cost rationing and risk rationing are also con-
sequences of lenders’ eﬀorts to mitigate information and enforcement problems. Just like
quantity rationed households, transaction cost and risk rationed households have unmet no-
tional demand and ﬁnd their resource allocation adversely aﬀected by their terms of access
to the credit market. We found that neglecting constraints deriving from transaction cost
and risk rationing would result in a signiﬁcant underestimation of both the frequency and
impacts of credit constraints in rural Peru.
Empirical evaluation of the relative importance of the diﬀerent forms of non-price ra-
tioning is crucial for the design of eﬀective policy. Examples of policies that may relax the
17We generated bootstrapped conﬁdence interval for these estimate by drawing with replacement 1000
sample from the original data and computing the estimates of the regional impacts in each sample (after
estimating the model on each sample). The 95% conﬁdence intervals for loss in regional output with the
restrictive deﬁnition is [14.5%,15.8%] while with the comprehensive deﬁnition it is [31.2%,34.1%].
30binding supply-side constraint facing quantity rationed households include land titling and
property rights reforms that make households’ assets more valuable to lenders as collateral
and investment in credit bureaus or other institutions that enhance the ﬂow of information
so that lenders can more easily identify high quality borrowers. These policies, however,
would do little to relax the constraints facing transaction cost and risk rationed households.
Instead, policies that streamline legal processes for registering collateral and enforcing loan
contracts or that provide a means of insuring households against production, price or health
risk would be more appropriate.
We outlined a survey methodology to determine whether or not a household is credit
constrained and, if so, to identify the rationing mechanism at play. This classiﬁcation relies
on two stages of questions that elicit diﬀerent types of information. The ﬁrst stage collects
information regarding the respondent’s actions and the outcomes of those actions: Were
any loan applications made? To which lenders? Were they approved? An additional set of
questions is required to determine the constraint status of non-applicant. These “interpre-
tive” questions are designed to understand the reasons that these respondents did not seek
a loan, as well as the actions they would take in counter-factual situations, such as whether
or not they would borrow if oﬀered a loan. While these subjective questions are second-best
in the sense that they do not rely on observed actions of respondents, we presented evi-
dence suggesting that they can provide a reliable method of separating constrained versus
unconstrained non-borrowers.
We conclude by suggesting two directions of methodological improvement for tackling
the challenging issue of separating constrained from unconstrained non-participants in the
credit market. The ﬁrst oﬀers reﬁnements to the DEM, while the second builds on the
randomization methodology discussed in the introduction.
Fine tuning of non-borrower perceptions module:
Consider again question 7 in Figure 2, which asks individuals who believe they qualify
31for a loan to explain why they did not apply. One means of strengthening the DEM is to
follow-up question 7 (and 9) with two additional lines of questioning. If the respondent
indicates that transaction costs are the primary reason for not applying, the enumerator
would then ask the respondent to identify the speciﬁc sources of the transaction costs and to
estimate the associated monetary and time costs. The second follow-up question would be
an additional counterfactual: “Would you seek a loan if these transaction costs (but not the
interest rate) were eliminated?’ Similar questions would be asked to apparent risk rationed
individuals who would ﬁrst be asked to describe what actions the lender would take if the
loan was not repaid. They would then be asked if they would seek a loan if the default
consequences (i.e. the contractual risk) were eliminated. These additional questions would
serve two purposes. First, identiﬁcation of the speciﬁc components and quantiﬁcation of
transaction costs can help inform policy. Second, responses to these two follow-up questions
would allow for more accurate classiﬁcation of the respondent’s rationing mechanism. For
example, consider a respondent who gave “fear of losing land” as the reason for not applying
in question 7. If this respondent then indicated that he would still not seek a loan even
if the risk of losing land were eliminated, the researcher would conclude that the lack of
demand is due primarily to lack of a proﬁtable investment project and not to contractual
risk. This respondent would then be classiﬁed as price rationed (unconstrained) instead of
risk rationed.
A second reﬁnement, still within the spirit of the DEM, that would help distinguish
constrained from unconstrained non-borrowers is to ask all non-borrowers what they would
do with a grant of a given size. Theory suggests that non-price rationed individuals have
a higher shadow value of liquidity and so should be more likely to say that they would
invest the money in their farm or business than price-rationed individuals. Again consider
a farmer who is apparently risk rationed based on question 7. We could more conﬁdently
classify this farmer as risk rationed if he then states that he would use the entire grant
32to purchase fertilizer than if he instead states that he would put the money in his savings
account. Conditional on this latter response, the researcher may re-classify the farmer as
price rationed.
Randomized Field Experiments:
Field randomizations, by exogenously varying the control variable of interest in a real-life
environment, oﬀer a highly attractive method of testing hypotheses relating to the extent of
and underlying causes of credit constraints. In the introduction to this paper we mentioned
several innovative research projects using randomizations. The randomizations of both Kar-
lan and Zinman (2006) and De Mel and Woodruﬀ (2006) relax a supply-side constraint and
thus focus on the extent and impacts of quantity rationing.
Randomizations may also be used to examine the prevalence and impact of demand-
side constraints. Gine and Yang (2007) have taken an innovative step in this direction. In
their work in Malawi, they randomized the oﬀer of a production loan linked with a rainfall
insurance contract to maize farmers. The control group was instead oﬀered only the credit
contract. In contrast to expectations, they found that the availability of insurance negatively
impacted loan demand. This research is also illustrative of the challenges and limitations of
ﬁeld randomizations. In particular, great care must be taken to ensure that the exogenous
treatment provided in the ﬁeld coincides with the theoretically intended treatment. This
is especially challenging when the treatment involved modifying contractual risk. Gine and
Yang suggest, for example, that their surprising results may be due to the “high cognitive
cost of evaluating insurance” (page 4). In other words, the authors suspect that farmers did
not perceive the insurance made available in the way that the authors designed.
We have argued that demand-side constraints are likely to be important barriers to agri-
cultural development, especially where insurance markets are weak. Unfortunately, transac-
tion cost and especially risk rationing have received little attention in academic and policy
circles. Identifying and distinguishing the multiple forms that credit constraints take is thus
33an important, although challenging task. The direct elicitation methodology oﬀers one ap-
proach to do so. As we hope is clear, we do not advocate the DEM to the exclusion of other
empirical methodologies. Instead we view it as a complement to other methods including
randomizations as well as others we have not discussed here such as qualitative case studies.
Ideally, researchers will “circle the wagons” around this critical question of the performance
of rural credit markets by bringing to bear multiple and complementary methods so that
policy can move forward in the most informed way possible.
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37Table 1: Common answers to question 7 and question 9 in Figure 2
Why did (would) you not apply for a formal loan? Constraint Status
A I do not need a loan.
B The interest rate is too high. Unconstrained
C Farming does not give me enough to repay a debt. (Price Rationed)
D I prefer working with my own liquidity.
E I don’t want to put my land at risk.
F I do not want to be worried, I am afraid. Constrained
G Formal lenders are too strict, they are not (Risk Rationed)
as ﬂexible as informal ones.
H Formal lenders do not oﬀer reﬁnancing.
I The branch is too far away. Constrained
J There is too much paperwork; the costs associated (Transaction Cost
with loan application are too high. Rationed)
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Sample Households
1997 2003
% with:
Less than 1 ha 3.8 4.3
Between 1 and 5 ha 74.3 77.0
Between 5 and 10 ha 13.3 11.7
More than 10 ha 8.6 7.0
Median farm size 3.0 3.0
% that own tractor 0.9 1.6
% with registered land title 49.4 70.0
% living in peasant community 43.1 43.1
Mean age of hh head 52.0 56.4
Mean schooling of hh head (years) 4.5 4.8
38Table 3: Frequencies of rationing mechanisms
1997 2003
unconstrained
price rationed borrower 28.2 27.8
price rationed non-borrower 16.5 28.7
constrained
quantity rationed 36.6 10.4
risk rationed 8.6 22.4
transaction cost rationed 10.2 10.8
Table 4: Comparison of Means of Key Correlates across Rationing Mechanisms
Unconstrained Constrained
Non- Quantity Risk Transaction
Variable Borrowers borrowers Rationed Rationed Cost Rationed
TITLE 0.785 0.611 0.508 0.736 0.449
DISTANCE 17.8 26.4 31.3 30.7 30.9
INFORMED 0.913 0.818 0.754 0.822 0.830
CV 0.552 0.555 0.562 0.569 0.542
RA 0.013 0.013 0.016 0.015 0.013
MAXINFORMAL 1.07 0.54 0.452 0.578 0.825
39Table 5: Deﬁnitions and Means of Variables Used in Multinomial Logit
Variable Name Deﬁnition Mean
Wealth Household wealth excluding farm land (*1000
Soles)
4.22
Labor Available family labor = Adult male equiva-
lents that do not hold a permanent job.
1.68
Educ Completed years of education of household
head
4.57
Land Farm size (hectares) 4.19
Title Proportion of farmland with registered prop-
erty title
0.66
Distance Distance in public transportation to nearest
formal lender (minutes)
26.30
Informed =1 if correctly identiﬁed the minister of eco-
nomics
0.84
CV Coeﬃcient of variation of yields in district 0.56
RA Absolute risk aversion of household head 0.01
Maxinformal Maximum transfer the household could receive
from family or friends in an emergency (*1000
Soles)
0.72
40Table 6: Marginal Impact of Regressors on Probability of Rationing Regimes
Price rationed Price rationed Transaction Risk Quantity
Variable borrower non-borrower cost rationed rationed rationed
Wealth 0.011∗∗ −0.002 0.000 −0.008 −0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
Labor 0.035 −0.003 −0.025∗ −0.015 0.007
(0.023) (0.020) (0.013) (0.021) (0.010)
Educ 0.010∗ −0.007 −0.000 −0.005 0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
Land −0.012∗ 0.004 −0.001 0.009∗∗ 0.000
(0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Title 0.190∗∗ −0.104∗∗ −0.067∗∗ 0.045 −0.062∗∗
(0.065) (0.044) (0.018) (0.053) (0.020)
Distance −0.004∗∗ 0.000 0.001 0.002∗∗ 0.001∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Informed 0.134∗∗ −0.056 −0.026 0.016 −0.073∗
(0.060) (0.061) (0.036) (0.055) (0.044)
CV −0.977 −0.290 −0.414 1.316∗∗ 0.365∗
(0.600) (0.485) (0.295) (0.427) (0.217)
RA −4.016 −5.514∗∗ −1.652 7.158∗∗ 4.024∗
(3.313) (2.781) (1.351) (3.730) (2.421)
Maxinformal 0.022 −0.012 0.008 −0.006 −0.012
(0.015) (0.020) (0.006) (0.018) (0.016)
Marginal eﬀects are estimated at sample median of regressors.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
**Indicates the marginal impact is signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*Indicates the marginal impact is signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
41Table 7: Productivity by rationing mechanism




Transaction Costs 10 843*
*: Statistically diﬀerent (at 5%) from the mean for price rationed households.
42Table 8: Deﬁnition and Summary Statistics of Variables included in Estimation 2
Variable Deﬁnition Mean Std. dev.
y revenue per ha ($) 1087.59 1002.64
land farm size (ha) 4.48 5.48
liquidity saving and credit (1000 $) 1.38 3.60
adult # of adults 4.15 1.96
dep (# of children )/(household size) 0.19 0.20
reginc # of adults with salaried job 0.13 0.38
herd head of cattle 1.58 4.23
rice 1 if cultivates rice 0.53 0.50
cotton 1 if cultivates cotton 0.21 0.41
banana 1 if cultivates banana 0.21 0.41
corn 1 if cultivates corn 0.35 0.48
time 1 if year is 1997 0.5 0.5
durables value of durable goods (1000 $) 0.53 1.22
T proportion of titled land 0.58 0.69
N proportion of neighbors with formal loan 0.28 0.26





























Hansen J stat χ2 0.086 0.008
p value 0.769 0.931
F-test IV ﬁrst stage 5.84 7.07
p value 0.003 0.001
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2. In the last 5 years, 
have you applied for 
a commercial bank 
loan and been 
rejected?




4. In which 
year? 
 




(skip to next 
section) 
6. Would a 
commercial bank 
lend to you if you 
applied? 
7. Why did you 
not apply? 
 
(skip to next 
section)
8. If you were certain that a 
commercial bank would 
approve your application, 
would you apply? 
YES NO
9. Why not? 
 




1.  [Instructions: Do not read this question out loud.]  According to the Loan Characteristics Table, 
did this household receive any loan from a commercial bank in the past 12 months? 
 

























Figure 2: Sample non-borrower perceptions module
46